Subtle Discrimination
提出“微妙歧视”概念，指无法客观确认为歧视的偏见行为。研究发现，在低风险晋升中受歧视者过度投资技能，高风险中则投资不足，导致技能与晋升结果出现巨大差距，并影响企业利润。
ABSTRACT We introduce the concept of subtle discrimination —biased acts that cannot be objectively ascertained as discriminatory. When candidates compete for promotions by investing in skills, firms' subtle biases induce discriminated candidates to overinvest when promotions are low‐stakes (to distinguish themselves from favored candidates) but underinvest in high‐stakes settings (anticipating low promotion probabilities). This asymmetry implies that subtle discrimination raises profits in low‐productivity firms but lowers them in high‐productivity firms. Although subtle biases are small, they generate large gaps in skills and promotion outcomes. We derive further predictions in contexts such as equity analysis, lending, fund flows, banking careers, and entrepreneurial finance.