Hidden Iceberg: The Informativeness of Analyst Silence After Corporate Site Visits
研究中国公司实地调研后分析师沉默是否传递私有信息，发现调研后15天内不发报告的分析师与后续负面盈利意外相关，沉默还伴随负面市场反应和机构卖出，尤其当机构买方压力大时更明显。
Abstract This study examines how sell‐side analysts’ silence following corporate site visits in China conveys private information. Using detailed site‐visit data, we find that analysts who refrain from issuing reports within 15 days after a visit are associated with subsequent negative earnings surprises, even after controlling for regulatory censorship concerns and alternative explanations. The association is stronger when site‐visit discussions have a more negative tone, place greater emphasis on forward‐looking information and contain more numerical detail, and it is particularly strong for analysts facing higher buy‐side pressure. Analyst silence is also associated with negative market reactions and increased institutional selling after visits, particularly for stocks subject to greater buy‐side pressure. This pattern is consistent with analyst silence stemming from pressure from institutional clients and possible disapproval from management. These results extend the literature on managerial and insider silence to the context of sell‐side analysts, offering new insights into how private information may be selectively transmitted between analysts and their institutional clients, and have important implications for regulators concerned with market information efficiency.