Loan Evergreening through Banks' Lenses: Evidence from Credit Product‐Level Data a
利用不同企业贷款类型的细粒度数据，识别出企业用纯利息贷款偿还现有分期贷款的续贷行为，发现避免侵蚀银行资本是银行对多银行企业进行僵尸贷款的重要原因，而对单银行企业的续贷则更多是为了让低信用借款人在别处获得融资并减少自身风险敞口。
Abstract We study the different rationales behind zombie lending. Exploiting granular data of different corporate loan types, we identify loan evergreening as instances where firms receive interest‐only loans to repay existing amortizing loans. Avoidance of losses that erode bank capital is an important reason for zombie lending to multiple‐bank firms, but not to single‐bank firms. When banks provide loan evergreening to single‐bank firms, these firms are less likely to receive credit and additional loan evergreening by the bank in the future, more likely to default, and to start new lending relationships afterward; this is consistent with banks providing loan evergreening to allow less creditworthy borrowers to obtain additional financing elsewhere and reduce their own exposure. Finally, zombie lending to multiple‐bank firms leads to credit displacement, but zombie lending to single‐bank firms does not.