The attack‐and‐defense conflict with the gun‐and‐butter dilemma
构建了一个包含生产、攻击和防御的一般均衡模型，发现防御方可能比攻击方投入更多资源于冲突，且内部均衡与角点均衡不能共存，有助于解释乌克兰、俄罗斯及哈马斯等案例中的高冲突支出。
Abstract We analyze a general equilibrium model of attack and defense with production. One attacker and one defender allocate fixed endowments between producing butter and guns. We characterize the unique interior and unique corner equilibrium, and find that (i) the defenders may spend more resources on conflict than the attacker even without loss aversion or other preferential bias, (ii) the attackers may expend all their resources only in conflict, and (iii) the interior and the corner equilibria cannot coexist. These results may help explain Ukraine's sustained high defense effort and Russia's militarized economy, or the excessive conflict expenditure by Hamas etc.