‘Profiting from at least one side’: goal conflict, performance feedback, and data manipulation
研究了中国政府在目标冲突下如何根据绩效反馈操纵数据，发现政府常通过夸大或压低数据来确保至少一个政策领域达标，对理解公共管理中的博弈行为有贡献。
This study examines how governments manipulate data in response to performance feedback under conflicting goals. Based on a game-theoretic framework and panel data from 168 Chinese cities between 2014 and 2019, we find that governments often seek to secure success in at least one policy area by inflating or suppressing performance data. These behaviors reflect both positive and negative data manipulation. The study contributes to the theoretical understanding of how performance feedback influences gaming behavior in public management and highlights the strategic responses of governments under competing goals.