Privacy and Team Incentives
研究了现实世界中合同通常私密的情况下，委托人如何通过授权最熟练代理人撰写其他代理人合同来缓解承诺问题，并分析了这种内生层级对努力、产出和租金抽取的影响。
ABSTRACT Real‐world contracts are typically private, observed only by their direct signatories, so agents working together are vulnerable to the principal opportunistically reducing other agents' incentives. The principal can mitigate this commitment problem by giving the most skilled agent a budget and delegating authority to write other agents' contracts. This endogenous hierarchy, never optimal with public contracts, raises effort, output, and compensation but allows rent extraction. The principal prefers it when contracts are opaque enough, skill is sufficiently heterogeneous across agents, and joint output is sensitive enough to effort. Our model provides novel predictions for the structure of banking syndicates.