Why Do Traditional and Shadow Banks Coexist?
通过模型解释传统银行与影子银行在2007年和新冠危机中的互动：好时期资产和负债从传统银行流向影子银行以规避监管，危机时则反向流动以缓解抛售。
Abstract Traditional and shadow banks interacted in similar ways in the 2007 and COVID-19 crises, when both assets and liabilities flew out of shadow banks and into traditional banks. We explain these facts in a model of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks in which liabilities and assets flow from the former to the latter in good times, avoiding regulation, and move the other way in a crisis, alleviating fire sales. The model sheds light on how regulations for traditional banks have (unintended) consequences on the shadow banking sector.