Managed decline: Muddling through with the Sterling (dis)Agreements, 1968–74
本文利用档案证据，质疑1968-74年英镑协议标志着英国成功管理英镑退休的观点，揭示政策缺乏战略连贯性，实际是官员优先维持而非减少英镑持有，其衰落更多源于英镑区国家寻求金融自由。
Abstract How do policymakers manage the decline of an international currency? This paper revisits the view that the ‘Sterling Agreements’ of 1968–74 – bilateral contracts between the UK and sterling‐holding governments – marked a successful paradigm shift towards sterling's managed ‘retirement’. Archival evidence reveals no strategic coherence to British policy in this period, a case of ‘muddling through’. Phased reductions in the amount of sterling protected by ‘guarantee’ were presented as steps on a path to ‘winding down’ sterling. But, when given options, British officials prioritized maintaining, rather than reducing, international sterling holdings, and the Agreements, if anything, tended to encourage their increase. Sterling's relative decline resulted more from sterling area countries seeking financial freedom, as the Bank of England – the Agreements’ designer and defender – lost policy influence.