Active Mutual Fund Common Owners’ Returns and Proxy Voting Behavior
研究发现，持有产品市场竞争对手股票的主动型股权共同基金，其风险调整后收益更高，且这些基金收费更高、投票更积极，倾向于反对高管薪酬与绩效挂钩、支持在竞争对手兼任董事的董事，表明代理投票可能是影响公司政策的机制。
Abstract Active equity mutual funds that own shares in product-market competitors have higher risk-adjusted returns, even after fees. This positive association comes from their common ownership positions, and remains robust after controlling for industry concentration, common stock selection, and the tendency to invest in firms with more common ownership. These funds charge higher fees and are active voters: more likely to vote against executive pay-for-performance and for directors with existing directorships in competitors. Our findings suggest that actively managed equity mutual funds are incentivized to soften product-market competition, and proxy voting may serve as a mechanism for influencing corporate policy.