Stakeholder-centric corporate misconduct and financing policies: A precautionary tale
研究发现，以利益相关者为中心的企业不当行为会导致公司增加现金持有、减少股利支付和债务融资，且治理较好的公司影响更显著；高现金持有与更高公司价值和更低资本成本相关，支持预防性动机而非代理冲突。
We investigate how stakeholder-centric corporate misconduct (CM) influences firms’ financial policies. CM is associated with higher cash holdings and lower dividend payouts and debt financing. These effects are more pronounced in firms with stronger governance. We further show that high cash holdings in CM firms are associated with higher firm value and lower implied cost of capital. Firms that replace their CEOs following CM adopt more conservative financial policies. Our evidence supports the precautionary motive for cash holdings, indicating that such reserves are unlikely to result from agency conflicts or increased managerial discretion in CM firms.