Does analyst participation in earnings conference calls curb real activities earnings management?
研究发现分析师更可能在业绩电话会议上询问被怀疑进行真实盈余管理公司的酌量性费用，这种提问与后续盈利预测修正下调、酌量性费用增加以及未来两年内达标或微超预期概率降低相关，表明分析师参与电话会议可能抑制经理人的真实盈余管理行为。
Abstract Sell‐side equity analysts serve as external monitors, yet evidence on how they fulfill this monitoring role remains limited. We examine whether analysts utilize earnings conference calls to monitor firms suspected of real earnings management and assess the implications of such monitoring. Our findings reveal that analysts are more likely to ask about discretionary expenses during conference calls of firms suspected of lowering these expenses to meet or narrowly beat analysts' expectations. These questions are associated with lower subsequent EPS forecast revisions, indicating a potential cost to managers. Moreover, analysts' questions on discretionary expenses to suspect firms are linked to subsequent increases in discretionary expenses and a lower likelihood of meeting or narrowly beating analysts' earnings expectations in the following 2 years. Overall, our results suggest that analysts' active participation in earnings conference calls potentially discourages managers from engaging in real earnings management.