Manipulation and Selection in Unemployment Insurance
利用意大利行政数据和聚集技术，研究个体为获得额外四个月失业保险而延迟解雇的操纵行为，发现操纵者基于长期失业风险而非道德风险成本被选择，并评估其对最优失业保险期限的影响。
Abstract In this paper we study the selection patterns of individuals who manage to have their layoff delayed around an age-at-layoff threshold entitling them to four additional months of unemployment insurance (UI), i.e., manipulators. Using administrative data from Italy and bunching techniques, we document substantial manipulation around the cutoff and show that manipulators are selected on their long-term nonemployment risk but not on their moral hazard cost. Finally, we develop a sufficient statistics framework to assess how these findings affect optimal UI duration in presence of manipulation.