Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?
研究了民主制度中由谁设定议程（多数派还是少数派）最优，发现少数派先提议、多数派后反提议的两轮提议加多数投票规则是局部最优的。
Abstract Who should set the agenda in a democracy—the majority or the minority? We address this question by studying public project provision, financing, and redistribution within democratic institutions. We show that the four features defining the following procedure are locally necessary, and together sufficient, for optimality: (i) there are two proposal-making rounds followed by a voting round (with majority rule); (ii) a member of the minority proposes first and a member of the majority counter-proposes; (iii) taxes are uniform; (iv) subsidies are fixed for agenda-setters. Our insights are compatible with the principle according to which minorities should have the first say in proposal-making.