When Should Public Programs Be Privately Administered? Theory and Evidence from the Paycheck Protection Program
研究私人公司分配公共资源的条件，利用薪资保护计划的企业调查数据，发现银行将贷款优先分配给高价值老客户，但处理效应异质性较小，表明委托可能优于延迟贷款以改善目标定位。
Abstract When should private companies allocate public resources? In our model, delegation is attractive when delay is costly, the impact of funds is similar across firms, and government and private objectives are aligned. We use novel firm-level survey data to measure heterogeneity in the impact of the Paycheck Protection Program and to assess whether banks targeted loans to high-impact firms. Banks did target loans to their most valuable pre-existing customers. However, we find that treatment effect heterogeneity is moderate, suggesting that delegation was likely superior from the government’s perspective to delaying loans to improve targeting.