Signaling Specific Skills and the Labor Market of College Graduates
利用行政数据和断点回归设计，研究哥伦比亚国家大学毕业考试中政府奖项对顶尖学生的劳动力市场影响。该奖项作为特定技能信号，使获奖者收入高出7%-10%，尤其对来自低声誉院校的毕业生效果显著，且收益持续五年。
Abstract Using administrative data and a regression discontinuity design, we study the labor market effects of a government-sponsored award given to top-performing students on Colombia’s national college exit exam. The award signals field-specific skills, leading recipients to earn seven to ten percent more than comparable peers without the signal. The benefits are concentrated among graduates from lowerreputation institutions, who enter the market with weaker signals and gain access to better job matches and higher-paying firms. These returns persist for up to five years, driven by an upward shift in the intercept of the wage-experience profile of those with weaker signals.