Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Naïvety
研究了买方推断能力异质（理性型与天真型）下的逆向选择环境，刻画了最大化卖方利润或交易剩余的最优菜单机制，发现无论逆向选择多严重，所有买方都会交易，并探讨了限制天真买方损失的消费者保护政策。
We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a naïve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's private information and the offer. We characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the seller's profits or trade surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is, all types of buyers trade. We then provide conditions under which the menu mechanism is optimal among all general mechanisms. A consumer protection policy limiting the naïve buyer's loss is also investigated.