Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms
提出学校选择机制只需防止“简单”虚报，并发现Kesten的效率调整延迟接受机制在弱要求下优于延迟接受机制，为实际市场设计提供新思路。
Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choice, this paper proposes that mechanisms ought to be immune only to certain “simple” misreports. While no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves on the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism, we find one under our weaker requirement: Kesten's (2010) efficiency adjusted DA (EADA). By extending our criterion to also prevent simple “collective” misreports, we obtain characterizations of Kesten's mechanism. These insights contribute to practical market design.