Dynamic Screening and the Dual Roles of Monitoring
研究了长期自我执行关系中监督的双重作用：筛选低能力类型并激励高能力类型，揭示了监督在筛选速度与激励效率之间的权衡，最优合同在筛选后对高能力类型过度监督以加速筛选。
This paper studies monitoring in long-term, self-enforcing relationships with adverse selection and moral hazard. Monitoring is used to screen low types by incentivizing them to shirk. Once high types have been identified, monitoring is used both to incentivize effort from high types and to provide off-path (dis)incentives for low types looking to build a reputation. This results in a key trade-off: providing cost-efficient incentives to high types, versus screening low types faster. The optimal contract uses probation after screening: high types are excessively monitored to facilitate better screening. Monitoring declines as the agent's track record improves.