(Pro-)Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure
研究了一个序贯实验模型，其中代理人自私地选择行动，但可以亲社会地披露经验；披露呈现极化且正向偏差，补贴披露成本可能反而减少披露但增加实验。
We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are prosocially motivated (forward-looking). Disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). The extent of disclosure is non-monotone in prior uncertainty. Subsidizing disclosure costs can paradoxically lead to less disclosure, but more experimentation.