Liquidity and leverage responses to mortgage downpayment subsidies
利用爱尔兰政府意外增加首付补贴的政策变化，研究发现借款者大幅减少自付首付、改善流动性，同时降低借款额和杠杆率，为补贴政策提供了新的传导渠道。
Abstract Policies that limit mortgage leverage face an inherent trade‐off between the benefits of reduced indebtedness and the erosion of liquidity buffers through larger downpayment requirements. Governmental downpayment subsidies, while not designed to address this trade‐off, can potentially alleviate it, particularly where borrowers are liquidity‐constrained. Exploiting a largely unanticipated increase in government subsidies toward downpayments in Ireland, we estimate that borrowers reduce their out‐of‐pocket downpayments substantially, improving their liquidity position. They also borrow less, at lower leverage ratios, providing an alternate potential transmission channel in a literature that has previously focussed on house price and housing supply effects.