How are patent decisions affected by environmental regulation?
研究了环境规制如何导致专利期限变短或变长。当环境机构比专利局更不灵活时，福利损失被放大，专利期限缩短；反之则延长。还考虑了绿色创新下环境政策宽松化对专利决策的影响。
This paper examines how the presence of environmental regulation may induce shorter or longer patents. In the absence of environmental regulation, the patent office faces a well-known tradeoff: a longer patent yields a welfare benefit from inducing more R&D investment, but generates a welfare loss from allowing a longer monopoly during the patent period. When environmental policy is present, we show that the welfare loss is emphasized (ameliorated) when the environmental agency is less (more) flexible than the patent office, thus inducing shorter (longer) patents. We also consider green innovations, showing that environmental policy becomes less stringent, and patent decisions approach those in the absence of regulation.