Do CEOs With a Financial Background Matter for the Success of Newly Public Firms?
研究发现，由金融背景CEO领导的新上市公司，其非自愿退市概率更低、上市后存活时间更长，且这一效应在大型复杂企业中更显著。
ABSTRACT We uncover strong evidence that newly public firms run by financial expert chief executive officers (CEOs) have a lower probability of involuntary delisting and a longer survival time in the aftermarket. This result is robust to alternative definitions of long‐term viability and endogeneity concerns. Our cross‐sectional analysis reveals that the positive effect of financial expert CEOs on initial public offering (IPO) survival is more pronounced in large and complex firms but weaker in dynamic settings. Additional tests show that CEOs with a career background in finance gain better access to the primary equity market than other domain experts, as evidenced by a more efficient price discovery process and greater financial visibility in the aftermarket. Furthermore, these CEOs are associated with more efficient post‐IPO outcomes which lie at the core of their skills set, such as capital expenditures and acquisitions, rather than research and development (R&D) projects, which are typically outside their domain of expertise.