Aggregated Compensation Peer Group Disclosure and Managerial Labor Market Competition: A Network Analysis
通过构建薪酬同行网络，提出衡量经理人劳动力市场分类和竞争的新方法，发现其能预测高管跳槽、解释争议薪酬实践，并为经理人提供锦标赛激励以提升未来业绩。
ABSTRACT In this paper, we develop novel measures of managerial labor market classification and competition by constructing networks of compensation benchmarking peers disclosed in proxy statements. These networks represent firms’ relative positions within the managerial labor market. Our classifications strongly predict executive moves across firms, outperforming a comprehensive set of predictors in the literature. Subsequent tests further demonstrate the strength of our methodology in capturing the multidimensional and dynamic features of the managerial labor market. We also validate our competition measures by showing that they are associated with retention tools, such as higher equity pay and longer pay duration. Finally, we apply our measures to test two theoretical predictions. First, we find that labor market competition could explain controversial pay practices. Second, we demonstrate that the labor market provides managers with tournament incentives to deliver superior future performance.