Do Shareholder Leverage Constraints Affect Debtholders?
研究发现共同基金的杠杆约束会促使投资组合公司增加风险承担，导致债权人面临更高信用风险和风险转移问题，进而提高借款成本并收紧贷款条件。
Abstract We examine the relationship between shareholder leverage constraints and corporate risk-taking, focusing on its impact on debtholders. Our findings show that mutual fund leverage constraints are related to more risk-taking activities of portfolio companies, inducing higher credit risk and greater risk-shifting concerns for the firms’ debtholders. In response, the debtholders raise borrowing costs and tighten lending conditions. These effects intensify for firms facing higher levels of conflict between debtholders and shareholders and when mutual funds exert greater influence over firms. Econometric analyses, including instrumental variable specifications and asset management company mergers, support a causal interpretation.