Dead money: measuring the influence of representatives on post-passage appropriations
利用议员死亡或辞职造成的国会选区空缺，研究发现缺乏代表导致选区在拨款后阶段的新合同资金减少4.5%，尤其对与多个机构有往来的选区影响更大（下降12.4%）。
Abstract Using deaths and resignations to identify spells where congressional districts were unrepresented in the House of Representatives, we investigate the effect of these vacancies on the post-passage appropriations process. We find that lack of representation leads to a substantial 4.5% decline in the intensive margin of appropriations (new contract funding) but no effect on the extensive margin (number of granting agencies). However, this effect is concentrated among those districts receiving money from more agencies. For this half of the distribution, the decline is a more substantial 12.4%. This holds for both initial awards and renegotiations to existing contracts. The effect does not seem to be driven by a higher elasticity of particular funding agencies. It would seem that districts with more relationships to handle suffer a greater decline in appropriations when they are without a representative simply because there are more opportunities to be missed.