Research Registries and the Credibility Crisis: An Empirical and Theoretical Investigation
分析了AEA RCT注册库作为应对实验研究可信度危机的政策工具，发现其影响有限，多数经济学实验未注册，注册者中仅约一半在干预前注册且细节不足，并与ClinicalTrials.gov对比，提出经济模型显示禁止延迟注册可显著提升注册库效果。
Abstract We analyze one prominent policy solution to the credibility crisis in experimental research—research registries—with primary focus on the AEA RCT Registry. We find that the AEA RCT Registry has had a limited impact to date. A majority of recent economics experiments are not registered, only about half of those registered did so prior to intervention, and most of these preregistrations lack sufficient detail. We find broad similarities when comparing these patterns to ClinicalTrials.gov. We then advance an economic model of registration to explore potential improvements to registries generally. The model shows banning late registration can significantly increase registry effectiveness.