Do bank insiders impede equity issuances?
研究了2003-2014年美国银行控股公司的内部人持股如何影响金融危机后的股权发行，发现高内部人持股的银行在危机后发行更少普通股，且内部人控制权私利越强，效应越明显。
We construct a novel panel of insider ownership for roughly 600 U.S. bank holding companies from 2003 to 2014 to test whether ownership structure shaped recapitalizations around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Insider ownership shows no discrete shift around the GFC. Using a difference-in-differences design with BHC and time fixed effects, we find that, after Q3 2008, banks with higher pre-crisis insider stakes issued significantly less common equity than otherwise similar peers. This effect is more pronounced where insiders enjoy greater private benefits of control, as proxied by insider lending and earnings opacity—consistent with dilution reluctance as the mechanism. The findings hold in propensity score matched regressions and when employing instrumental variables for insider ownership. These results reveal that ownership structure affects banks’ equity issuances in crises, underscoring the importance of accounting for ownership structure in bank stress tests and capital-regulation frameworks.