An inverse-Ramsey tax rule
传统最优商品税理论主张对需求弹性低的商品征高税，但现实中政策常反其道而行。本文建模发现，若纳税人过度自信于自己比他人更能避开被征税商品，则均衡时弹性高的商品反而税负更重。
Traditional optimal commodity tax analysis, dating back to Ramsey (1927), prescribes that to maximize welfare one should impose higher taxes on goods with lower demand elasticities. Yet policy makers do not stress minimizing efficiency costs as a desideratum. In this note we revisit the commodity tax problem, and show that the attractiveness of the Ramsey inverse-elasticity prescription can itself be inverted if the tax system is chosen – or at least strongly influenced – by taxpayers who are overly confident of their ability, relative to others, to substitute away from taxed goods. • Tax policy often favors higher taxes on more elastic goods, contrary to the Ramsey rule: why? • A model: agents are overconfident about their relative ability to substitute from taxed goods. • Thus, they believe taxes on elastic goods are borne disproportionately by other agents. • Value of perceived burden shifting offsets efficiency costs of more elastic tax base. • With sufficient overconfidence equilibrium taxes are higher on more elastic goods.