Market Feedback Effect on CEO Pay: Evidence from Peers’ Say-on-Pay Voting Failures
研究发现，当同行的薪酬投票（Say-on-Pay）出现重大失败时，焦点公司的股价会受负面影响，进而导致CEO薪酬在后续期间被削减。这种效应在董事会权力较大、代理顾问对CEO薪酬表示担忧以及薪酬顾问质量较低时更为显著。
Abstract This article shows that when a compensation peer firm experiences a significant failure in its say-on-pay (SOP) voting, the focal firm’s stock price is adversely affected, resulting in reduced CEO pay in the subsequent period. This pay-reduction effect is amplified when the board is more powerful, when proxy advisors express concerns about CEO pay, and when the compensation consultant lacks quality. Directors who react to the price drop and cut the CEO’s pay receive higher votes in future director elections, implying a market feedback effect for directors of the focal firm triggered by their peers’ SOP voting failure.