Balancing Power in Decentralized Governance: Quadratic Voting and Information Aggregation
研究了在去中心化治理中，当选民信息不完全时，二次投票机制可能不如简单线性投票有效，因为成本凸性会抑制信息充分选民的表达，最优机制取决于选民利益和信息分布。
In decentralized governance, quadratic voting (QV)—where the cost of acquiring voting power is convex—optimally aggregates voter preferences, outperforming simpler linear voting (LV) mechanisms when voters have complete information. But what if they do not? We show that uncertainty not only breaks QV optimality but can also cause it to underperform LV. Intuitively, this is because cost convexity can disincentivize better-informed voters from adequately conveying their private information. The optimal mechanism varies with the distribution of stakes and information among voters, implying that QV’s known advantages in preference aggregation do not readily extend to common-value information aggregation settings. This paper was accepted by Will Cong for the Special Issue on the Digital Finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08469 .