Independent Director‐Affiliated Donations and Stock Price Crash Risk
研究中国上市公司中独立董事通过关联捐赠建立的社会关系如何影响股价崩盘风险，发现关联捐赠会加剧未来崩盘风险，且在公司治理弱、外部监督少、非国有企业中更显著。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how independent director‐affiliated corporate donations affect stock price crash risk in China. We find a significant positive relationship between affiliated donations and future crash risk. The relationship is more significant for firms with weak internal governance and limited external monitoring, when affiliated directors serve on the audit committee, and in non‐state‐owned enterprises. Overall, our findings suggest that the social ties built through affiliated donations undermine rather than enhance director monitoring, and that agency theory has more explanatory power than resource dependence theory for understanding the impact of affiliated donations on stock price crash risk.