Can a reviewing-based contract coordinate a supply chain of mobile apps?
针对移动应用平台与开发者之间收入分享合同的不公平问题，提出一种成本加成合同，其中平台收入与审核成本挂钩，通过博弈论分析比较两种合同在风险中性及风险敏感情况下的表现。
Nowadays, app developers perceive the commonly-used revenue-sharing contract as unjust when the sales volume is high, and thus engage in legal battles or try to bypass the platform’s billing system. To address this issue, we propose a new cost-plus contract in which the platform’s income is proportional to its expenses in reviewing the app. The cost of the app’s development, as well as the cost of the reviewing process, are correlated with the app’s quality. Following the stochastic nature of demand, and assuming risk sensitivity of the parties, we bring a game-theoretic analysis of each contract, where demand is sensitive to the app’s selling price and quality level. For the case of risk-neutral parties, we conduct an analytical comparison between the two contracts and show that all measures are higher under the new contract than under the commonly-used contract, except for the platform’s expected profit, which is higher under the latter. For the case of a risk-sensitive developer and risk-neutral platform, and the opposite case, we conduct an extensive numerical analysis and show that the new contract is preferable to the developer, whereas for the platform it is preferable only under certain conditions with regard to the parties’ risk-aversion levels.