Why Regulate Junk Fees?
探讨垃圾费（如强制后端费用和隐藏附加费）如何抬高价格、扭曲消费者选择，并分析监管措施对市场效率和消费者福利的影响，适合关注定价政策与消费者保护的学者。
This essay examines the growing prevalence of junk fees, including mandatory back-end fees and hidden add-on charges, which obscure the true cost of goods and services. Drawing on examples from event tickets, hotels, cable bills, restaurants, and financial services, I show how these pricing practices increase search costs and equilibrium prices, distort consumer choices, and divert innovation toward exploitative rather than value-enhancing strategies. Economic theory and evidence suggest that competition and disclosure alone are often insufficient to discipline junk fees. I review recent regulatory responses, including federal and state rules that require all-in-one upfront pricing, and discuss their implications for consumer welfare and market efficiency. The rapid evolution of junk fee policies provides economists with rich opportunities to study their intended and unintended consequences. At its core, the case for regulating junk fees rests not on paternalism but on enhancing market functioning.