Model-Based Capital Regulation: Where Do We Stand and Where Should We Go from Here?
本文回顾了基于模型的资本监管（如巴塞尔II）的演变与挑战，指出大银行利用模型自由裁量权降低资本要求、放大系统性风险，并主张简化监管（如杠杆率）与强化股权标准以提升金融稳定性。
This article examines the evolution and challenges of model-based capital regulation in banking, discussing its impact on banking system resilience and financial stability. Introduced with Basel II, model-based regulation sought to link capital requirements to asset risk but encountered practical issues like discretion in banks’ risk reporting, complexity, and procyclicality, weakening its effectiveness. Large banks often exploited modeling discretion to reduce capital requirements, lowering equity levels and amplifying systemic risk, as evidenced in the global financial crisis of 2008. While greater distance between banks and supervisors limits discretion, the findings underscore the advantages of simpler frameworks, such as leverage ratios, for enhancing transparency and stability. Political economy considerations, however, complicate international regulatory alignment, as national regulators balance stability objectives with considerations about domestic competitiveness. The article concludes that streamlined regulation paired with strong and robust equity standards would bolster financial stability and calls for further research on regulatory frameworks and systemic risk.