Retailer alliance and power structure shift in green brand supply chain under low-carbon operating environment
研究了低碳环境下由主导制造商和两个零售商组成的绿色品牌供应链，分析了零售商联盟的可能性及其导致的权力结构变化，发现仅在纳什权力结构下零售商总有结盟动机。
Considering a low-carbon operating environment featured by consumer low-carbon preference (CLP) and hybrid carbon policies, we construct a green brand supply chain consisting of a dominant manufacturer and two retailers. Under the green brand (GB) strategy, the manufacturer achieves green production through green technology and recycling, and the two retailers conduct green marketing activities. We adopt the differential game approach to characterise the dynamics of the green brand (GB) image, and fully consider the possibility of alliance between competing retailers and the consequent power structure shift. By analysing the four models, the results show that only when the retailer alliance has equal bargaining power with the manufacturer, i.e. the Nash power structure, competing retailers always have incentives to form an alliance. Under other power structures, the market condition for retailers to ally depends on the marginal effect of green production on GB image. For the manufacturer, the emergence of the retailer alliance may lead to positive outcomes. Under certain conditions, each player has the highest profit under the Nash power structure. In addition, we examine the impacts of the dynamic operating environment on equilibrium solutions and retailers’ alliance behaviour.