On the timing of moves in two-player games
提出一个连续时间框架分析两人博弈，玩家选择行动及其时机，并应用于价格竞争与市场进入问题，预测价格领导者身份。
We introduce a novel continuous-time framework for analyzing two-player games. Each player can move at most once, choosing an action along with its timing. We introduce assumptions that allow for a natural representation of such games, and establish results on the relation between discrete and continuous time. Unlike in Simon and Stinchcombe [1989], action sets are compact subsets of R n (rather than finite). This substantially increases the scope for applications. For illustration, we analyze different variants of price competition with entry in continuous time. Our framework handles complexities such as discontinuous changes in prices, and allows us to predict the identity of the price leader with minimal calculation. We show that it depends on product differentiation and on the possibility to deter entry.