Organizational culture and social control
分析了组织内主导群体如何通过金钱奖励和社会不赞同来影响另一群体接受其偏好的规范，并探讨了社会控制与组织承诺的互动，适用于竞争性企业的利润最大化行为。
Abstract I analyze the formation of organizational social norms, focusing on the interaction between two distinct groups, a dominant and a dominated one, such as management and workers, whereby the former is interested in the latter group adopting its preferred norm. To this end, the management exercises social control, using pecuniary awards for complying with norms deemed appropriate. I explore how social disapproval of deviance from the dominant norm and commitment to the organization interact with pecuniary control policies in affecting compliance, and consider an application to profit-maximizing behavior of competitive firms.