The Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on Small U.S. Banks
通过动态银行模型量化《多德-弗兰克法案》对美国小银行和银行进入的影响，发现资本要求与合规成本的相互作用在短期内加剧银行倒闭，且监管负担增加解释了2010年以来约70%的银行进入下降。
Abstract I estimate a dynamic banking model to quantify the impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on small banks and bank entry in the United States. The model features a bank portfolio‐choice problem with a risk‐return trade‐off in the loan market. My counterfactual experiments uncover a novel regulatory dis‐synergy: while tighter capital requirements mitigate bank risk, higher compliance costs create a risk‐seeking incentive for banks. The interaction of the two creates a strong destabilizing effect that aggravates bank failures in the short run. Furthermore, I find that increases in regulatory burdens explain about 70% of the collapse of bank entry since 2010.