Higher-order forward guidance
构建了一个包含内生波动率的商业周期模型，研究零利率下限下央行前瞻指引的作用，发现可信的未来稳定承诺能抑制过度波动，但承诺不干预可能带来更优均衡路径，且保持未来干预时机不确定优于其他策略。
This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a trade-off between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabilization uncertain strictly dominates other forward-guidance strategies.