The capacity investment cooperative game of agricultural coalition under uncertainties
研究了独立农户在产量和需求不确定下如何通过合作博弈实现风险共担，提出最优联合产能投资与公平成本分摊方案，确保联盟稳定且可扩展。
This study addresses a critical challenge in agricultural management: enabling stable cooperation among independent agricultural producers facing both yield and demand uncertainties. We develop a decision-analytic framework based on the cooperative game theory to facilitate the risk pooling through an optimal joint capacity investment decision and a fair cost allocation scheme. By formulating the problem as a stochastic linear program, we leverage duality theory to establish the non-emptiness of the core in the resulting capacity investment game, thereby ensuring the stability of the grand coalition. For coalitions with linear investment costs, we prove the game is convex, implying population monotonicity, which incentivises coalition expansion. We further extend the analysis to concave investment costs, capturing economies of scale, and again establish a nonempty core via a stochastic duality-based allocation scheme. Our results demonstrate that the proposed approach provides a computationally tractable and incentive-compatible mechanism for forming robust production coalitions. The findings offer a-priori planning tool for agricultural producers, underscoring that collaboration under uncertainties is not only beneficial but also sustainable through rationally designed allocation schemes.