Portfolio Regulation of Financial Institutions with Market Power
研究了投资组合监管如何影响具有市场势力的金融机构之间的风险分担，发现适当的投资组合限制可以改善流动性和风险分担，但过度监管可能适得其反。
Abstract We examine how portfolio regulations affect risk sharing between financial institutions with market power. Unconstrained access to complete markets permits flexible exploitation of market power and induces inefficient risk sharing. Appropriate portfolio restrictions counteract this, improving liquidity and risk sharing by bundling securities with offsetting strategic incentives. However, excessive regulation can be counterproductive, destroying gains from trade. An application of our theory shows that cross-asset spillovers are critical for policy evaluation: in general equilibrium, risk sharing can improve even if certain asset-specific liquidity measures deteriorate. We also discuss the effects of asymmetric regulation for different institutions.