Endogenous Outside Option and Data Privacy
研究了当消费者的外部选择由自身努力内生决定时，数据控制（选择退出数据收集）与数据披露率（数据被分享给垄断者的概率）如何交互影响福利。发现数据控制总是降低垄断者利润，但结合中等披露率可改善消费者福利。
ABSTRACT I study the implications of data privacy when consumers' outside options are endogenously determined by their efforts. “Data control” refers to consumers' ability to opt out of data collection on their efforts. “Data disclosure rate” refers to the likelihood that the collected data are shared with a monopolist. I examine their differences and consider how their interplay affects welfare. Without data control, the data disclosure rate affects the monopolist's profit nonmonotonically but has no impact on consumer welfare. More data control always decreases the monopolist's profit. But if combined with an intermediate data disclosure rate, data control improves consumer welfare.