Authority and Specialization Under Informational Interdependence
分析了在信息相互依赖下，权威集中或分散如何影响代理人获取信息的激励，发现限制代理人信息范围可改善沟通，而分散权威可能导致决策者忽视相互依赖关系，对跨国公司管理子公司权威有启示。
ABSTRACT We analyze authority allocation to incentivize information acquisition under interdependence. Agents access noisy signals about two states of the world. Beyond costs, acquisition depends on the expected influence on decisions, determined by whether authority is centralized or split among decision‐makers. Restricting an agent's information on the extensive margin enhances communication. When such specialization is not feasible, informational congestion may induce similar incentive effects. Split authority may lead decision‐makers to lose perspective by failing to internalize interdependence. The findings suggest that multinational corporations must manage the extent of authority granted to subsidiaries to ensure efficient information flow across products and regions.