Major customers and firms' reliance on bank debt
研究发现大客户的存在会减少企业对银行债务的依赖，因为大客户的监督替代了银行的监督作用，这一效应在治理较弱、信息不透明、资产专用性高或竞争不激烈的企业中更明显。
This study investigates how major customers affect firms' choice between bank debt and public debt. Our findings show that major customers lead firms to rely less on bank debt, as the monitoring of major customers substitutes for bank monitoring. This effect is more pronounced for firms that lack strong alternative governance mechanisms, operate in opaque information environments, have more relationship-specific assets, and face less competitive markets. In addition, we rule out the alternative explanation that firms reduce bank loans due to stricter covenants prompted by firms' increased risk associated with major customers. Taken together, our findings reveal how major customers' monitoring shapes firms' demand for creditor oversight and complement the literature on how supply chains affect corporate financing strategies.