Evidence and skepticism in verifiable disclosure games
研究了在可验证披露博弈中，接收者先验信念的变化如何导致更多怀疑，即无论其偏好如何，都会对发送者的每条消息采取更不利的均衡行动，并给出了接收者先验信念期望更多证据的定义。
A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receiver"s prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence than another and show that this characterizes more skepticism. As an input, I fully characterize receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes in general verifiable disclosure games.