Monetary/fiscal policy dominance and conflicts: Evidence from crises
通过估计带有马尔可夫转换交互机制的财政与货币政策规则，研究了美国和欧元区在全球金融危机和新冠疫情中的政策协调与冲突，发现美国危机期间呈现财政主导，而欧元区则保持货币主导，但成员国间存在异质性。
We estimate a system of fiscal and monetary policy rules with Markov-switching interaction regimes to study policy coordination and conflict in the United States and the Euro Area during the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. In the United States, we find shifts between policy coordination regimes, with both crises occurring under fiscal dominance. In contrast, the Euro Area displays persistent monetary dominance, despite temporary crisis-induced deviations. A country-level analysis shows that Germany follows the aggregate Euro Area pattern, while France and Italy exhibit policy conflict regimes, reflecting heterogeneity within the monetary union. • US crises occurred under fiscal dominance with pre-existing rising deficits. • Euro Area remained anchored in monetary dominance, with brief crisis deviations. • Germany mirrors EA stability, while France and Italy experience conflict regimes. • Policy regime shifts align with historical turning points and crisis responses.