Multi‐Product Monopolist and Information Design
研究多产品垄断者如何设计信息披露和定价策略，发现最优菜单在特定条件下揭示最高质量产品并分配它，并给出了事前统一定价机制的最优条件。
ABSTRACT We study the information design and pricing decision of a multi‐product monopolist who faces a buyer with unit demand. Under omniscient disclosure, we show that one profit‐maximizing menu reveals the identity of the highest quality product and allocates that product, provided a type‐specific quality threshold is met. This menu remains optimal under private disclosure if the buyer's value has constant differences in quality and type, or if the value has non‐decreasing differences in quality and type and the threshold type is independent of quality. We also characterize the conditions under which an ex‐ante and non‐discriminatory posted price mechanism is optimal.