Corporate General Counsels and Investment Efficiency: Novel Evidence
研究美国上市公司总法律顾问是否影响投资效率，发现他们能减少信息不对称，改善资本获取，从而在投资不足时增加投资、在过度投资时减少投资，且CEO技能与总法律顾问协同提升决策。
ABSTRACT We examine whether the presence of corporate general counsels (GCs) is associated with investment efficiency using both conditional and unconditional regressions. Utilizing a large sample of publicly listed US firms, we find that GCs are associated with higher investment in environments prone to underinvestment and lower investment in environments where overinvestment is likely. Firms with GCs also display less deviation from predicted investment levels, supporting the GC gatekeeper role. We further demonstrate that GCs reduce information asymmetry, which in turn improves access to capital and ultimately enhances investment efficiency. Additional tests reveal that certain GC characteristics, including age, tenure, and executive rank, enhance investment efficiency. Moreover, we find that CEO expertise complements the influence of GCs, as skilled CEOs and GCs work synergistically to improve decision‐making and address investment inefficiencies. Finally, the impact of GCs is particularly significant in the post‐SOX period, underscoring the importance of regulatory oversight.