Optimal Ownership and Capital Structure with Agency Conflicts
构建连续时间模型，研究控股股东、小股东与债权人之间的代理冲突如何影响投资决策，发现代理成本与私人收益、税率、波动率等呈U型关系，并解释最优所有权与资本结构的形成。
Abstract We develop a continuous-time model examining agency conflicts among controlling shareholders (managers), minority shareholders, and creditors in corporate investment decisions. The manager’s private benefits encourage overinvestment, while their equity stake and debt overhang lead to underinvestment. We show these offsetting incentive effects can achieve optimal investment timing under certain conditions. Agency costs exhibit U-shaped relationships with private benefits, tax rates, volatility, managerial ownership, and leverage. The model reveals how the interplay among agency conflicts, tax benefits, and bankruptcy costs shapes optimal ownership and capital structure, explaining several documented empirical patterns in corporate finance.