新进入者与合同删减

New Entrants and Contract Redaction

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · 2025
被引 0
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

利用美国人口普查数据,研究发现行业中新企业数量越多,现有企业越可能删减重要合同中包含的专有信息,且该效应在竞争风险高、外部融资依赖低、外国子公司少时更强。

Abstract

ABSTRACT Using the US Census data to capture new entrants, we find that incumbents are more likely to redact proprietary information embedded in material contracts when a greater number of new firms establish their businesses in the focal firm's industry. The effect remains significant when we measure new entrants by the net growth in the number of firms within an industry. Moreover, the effect of new entrants on contract redactions is significantly stronger when the focal firm has greater competition risk, lower dependence on external financing, and fewer foreign subsidiaries. Finally, we identify new entrants based on potential product entries through patents. These alternative aspects of new entrants are also linked to a significant increase in incumbents’ contract redactions. These results indicate that the presence of new entrants intensifies the influence of product market threats on incumbents’ disclosure decisions, leading to increased redaction of proprietary information in contracts.

新进入者合同编辑专有信息产品市场竞争